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Abstract and Keywords
Nāṣir-i Khusraw (d. 481/1088), the renowned Ismāʿīlī philosopher, poet, travel writer, and 
missionary (dāʿī), took on the formidable challenge of showing the essential harmony 
between philosophy and Ismāʿīlī doctrine in his Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn (The Reconciliation of 
Philosophy and Religion). After introducing his life and works, this chapter explores this 
text’s central themes and examines the manner in which Nāṣir attempts to achieve this 
reconciliation. Fundamental to Nāṣir’s method is a form of spiritual hermeneutics, or
taʾwīl, through which he demonstrates that the truths of philosophy serve as iconic 
representations of the spiritual truths contained in the Ismāʿīlī interpretation of Islam, 
thereby restoring philosophy to its original state of union with revealed, prophetic 
wisdom.
Keywords: Ismāʿīlī, philosophy, ḥikma, hermeneutics, theology, cosmology, Universal Intellect, Universal Soul,
Neoplatonism, taʾwīl
8.1. Life and Works
MOST of what is known of Nāṣir-i Khusraw comes from his own writings. Born in Khurāsān 
in 394/1004 into a notable family, Nāṣir served as a treasury official under the Seljuqs for 
several years. In his early forties, he experienced a powerful dream that lead him to set 
out in search of wisdom and true happiness. Through this pursuit of knowledge, he 
eventually journeyed to Cairo. Cairo was the seat of the Fatimid Caliphate established by 
the Ismāʿīlīs—a community of Shīʿī Islam that upholds the continuation of the religious 
and charismatic authority of the Prophet Muḥammad through a line of hereditary 
spiritual leaders, or imams. This line began with ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) and 
continues through an uninterrupted chain of his descendants to the present day.
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While the exact details remain unclear, Nāṣir did come to embrace the teachings of 
Ismāʿīlī Islam and received intellectual and spiritual training at the hands of his teacher 
al-Muʾayyad fī l-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 470/1078). This initiation culminated in Nāṣir giving his 
allegiance (bayʿa) to the Fatimid imam-caliph al-Mustanṣir bi-llāh (d. 487/1094). Nāṣir 
then returned to Khurāsān as a Fatimid Ismāʿīlī summoner (dāʿī), holding the exalted 
rank of ḥujjat (the “proof” of the Imam). Nāṣir’s teaching activities were met with both 
success and great danger. On account of the latter, he was forced to flee eastward and 
live the remainder of his life in the village of Yumgān, located in the remote Pamir 
Mountains. Nāṣir found refuge under the protection of the benevolent prince Abū l-Maʿālī 
ʿAlī b. al-Asad and continued teaching and writing until the end of his life. His spiritual 
and intellectual legacy has had a lasting impact upon the Ismāʿīlī Muslim communities of 
Central Asia, among whom his poetry continues to be recited, his prose read and 
reflected upon, and his personality revered.
(p. 170) In addition to being known for having written several important travel diaries in 
Persian (Khusraw, Book of Travels), Nāṣir is still regarded as one of the greatest poets of 
the Persian language. This explains why many popular versions and at least two scholarly 
editions of his collected poetic works (Dīwān) are extant (for his philosophical poetry, see 
the studies in Hunsberger 2013).
Among Nāṣir’s prose works are his Gushāyish wa-rahāyish (Knowledge and Liberation), 
which deals with thirty questions of a theological and philosophical nature concerning 
subjects such as the Creator and creation, eternity and time, free will and predestination, 
and the soul-body relationship (Khusraw, Liberation). Khwān al-ikhwān (The Feast of the 
Brethren) is a text of one hundred chapters concerning a number of subjects, including 
metaphysics, the nature of the human rational soul, the concept of creation, and 
eschatology. This text also reworks parts of the Kitāb al-Yanābīʿ (The Book of Wellsprings) 
of the Ismāʿīlī philosopher Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī (d. after 361/971), whose adoption of 
Neoplatonic metaphysics left a lasting impression on medieval Ismāʿīlī thought in general, 
and the thought of Nāṣir in particular (Sijistānī 1994). Shish faṣl (Six Chapters) explicates 
a number of key Ismāʿīlī metaphysical teachings concerning, inter alia, God, cosmology, 
psychology, and soteriology. Zād al-musāfirīn (Provisions for Travellers) deals with the 
human quest for knowledge and the necessary provisions one requires along this journey 
(Khusraw, Zād). Wajh-i dīn (The Face of Religion) provides an esoteric interpretation of 
Ismāʿīlī law (sharīʿat), covering subjects such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage 
(Khusraw, Expressions).
The most important text for our present purposes is the Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn. This Persian 
work was written at the request of Nāṣir’s aforementioned patron, who had asked him to 
address a number of challenging philosophical and religious questions posed by a certain 
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Abū l-Ḥaytham al-Jurjānī in a lengthy poem. As Nāṣir composed this text based on the 
structure of the questions posed by Jurjānī, his explanations of the major doctrinal 
themes are often scattered throughout several chapters. What follows is a reconstructed 
presentation of the central theological, philosophical, and mystical doctrines to be found 
throughout the Jāmiʿ.
8.2. Overview
Nāṣir-i Khusraw explains his reasons for composing the Jāmiʿ with reference to the four 
Aristotelian causes (efficient cause, material cause, formal cause, final cause), but divides 
the material cause into two aspects, thereby presenting us with five causes. Nāṣir himself 
is the efficient cause, his pen and knife constitute the instrumental or (p. 171) active 
material cause, the paper upon which the text is written is the passive material cause, the 
forms of learning that Nāṣir possesses comprise the formal cause, and the prince who 
requested Nāṣir’s response to Jurjānī’s questions is the final cause. Nāṣir also adds two 
further causes, the spatial and the temporal cause. These seven causes that Nāṣir 
presents evoke several key Ismāʿīlī doctrinal symbols, such as the seven heavens, seven 
Messengers, seven Imams, etc. which are further discussed below.
Nāṣir’s stated purpose in writing the Jāmiʿ is to “reconcile the science of true religion, 
which is one of the products of the Holy Spirit, with the science of creation, which is one 
of the necessary concomitants (ʿalāʾiq) of philosophy” (Jāmiʿ, ¶20, 32). By 
“philosophy” (falsafa), Nāṣir is evidently referring to the Greek intellectual heritage 
stemming from what he refers to as the “deiform philosophers” (mutaʾallihān-i falāsifa), 
namely Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (Jāmiʿ, ¶65, 67). The overall thrust of 
his work is therefore to demonstrate that philosophical wisdom (ḥikmat) stands in 
harmony with Ismāʿīlī wisdom (ḥikmat). His intentions are also motivated by an 
annoyance with certain Muslims in his own time who spurned the study of the physical 
world as unbelief (Jāmiʿ, ¶15, 27). He answers such a charge by citing a well-known 
prophetic saying, “reflect on the creation but not on the Creator,” and concludes, in a 
manner similar to that of Averroes (d. 595/1198) some two centuries later (Averroes
Decisive Treatise, 2), that reflection on creation must be religiously obligatory (Jāmiʿ, 
¶15, 27). Besides his patron, Nāṣir also has two potential audiences in mind: his Ismāʿīlī 
co-religionists and the philosophers/logicians. He therefore takes recourse to both 
scriptural statements and demonstrative modes of argumentation through the work, but 
clearly gives priority to revelation:
1
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In it I have spoken both to the sages of religion, using verse from God’s Book and 
from the Traditions of His Prophet, and to the sages of philosophy and the experts 
in logic, employing rational proofs together with premises leading to satisfying 
conclusions. For the treasury of wisdom lies in the secret heart of him who is the 
seal and the heir of the prophets—upon them be peace—and yet, there is also a 
whiff (shammatī) of wisdom in the writings of the ancients.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶21, 33)
The Jāmīʿ contains thirty-four chapters. The layout of each chapter is explicatory and 
contrastive in that Nāṣir first presents the views of the philosophers on a particular issue, 
and then presents the doctrines of the Ismāʿīlis—referred to as the Sages of the True 
Religion (ḥukamā-yi dīn-i ḥaqq), the People of Spiritual Hermeneutics (ahl-i taʾwīl), or the 
People of Spiritual Inspiration (ahl-i taʾyīd)—which either critique or supplement the 
views of the philosophers. Nāṣir’s method of engaging with Jurjānī’s questions and 
reconciling the seemingly divergent positions of philosophy and Ismāʿīlī doctrine is that of 
taʾwīl, a form of spiritual hermeneutics employed by Ismāʿīlī authors throughout their 
writings. The following section serves as an illustration of how taʾwīl is a fundamental 
feature of the Jāmiʿ, as well as the key that leads one to the central argument of the work.
(p. 172) 8.3. Hermeneutics
The Ismāʿīlī thinkers distinguished between the ẓāhir (exoteric) and bāṭin (esoteric) 
dimensions of religion. For them, taʾwīl is a method of spiritual hermeneutics that 
disclosed the bāṭin of the divine revelation, namely the Qurʾān. As Nāṣir-i Khusraw 
defines the term, taʾwīl is “to return” a thing to its metaphysical origin. The opposite of 
this term is tanzīl, which is to “bring down” or express spiritual realities from this origin 
in the form of sensible symbols and parables. The concepts of tanzīl and taʾwīl as 
respective movements of descent and ascent are situated within an ontology, in relation 
to which “taʾwīl presupposes the superimposition of worlds and interworlds, as the 
correlative basis for a plurality of meanings in the same text” (Corbin 1977, 53–54).
Nāsir’s worldview envisages a chain of being that consists of several “worlds”: the 
spiritual World of Origination (ʿālam-i ibdāʿ) or the metacosm, the physical World of 
Nature (ʿālam-i ṭabīʿat) or the macrocosm, and the intermediary World of Religion (ʿālam-i 
dīn) or the mesocosm which bridges the spiritual and physical worlds. The World of 
Religion is comprised of human beings, each of whom is a microcosm (ʿālam-i ṣaghīr) 
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possessing a physical body and a spiritual soul. These worlds each contain a number of 
hierarchical degrees or limits (ḥudūd).
The World of Origination consists of eternal, spiritual, subtle or simple beings such as the 
Universal Intellect (ʿaql-i kullī), the Universal Soul (nafs-i kullī), and the three archangelic 
hypostases called Jadd (Fortune), Fatḥ (Opening), and Khayāl (Imagination), and who are 
identified with the archangels Seraphiel, Michael, and Gabriel (Jāmiʿ, ¶140, 129). The 
World of Nature contains temporal, physical, dense or composite beings comprised of 
matter and form, including the celestial bodies, elements, minerals, plants, various 
species of animals, etc. The World of Religion consists of human beings in general and 
the hierarchical ranks of the Ismāʿīlī summons (daʿwa) in particular—consisting of the 
lawgiving prophet known as the Enunciator (nāṭiq) or the Messenger (rasūl), his Legatee 
(waṣī), the Imam, the Proof (ḥujjat), the Summoner (dāʿī), the Licensed Teacher 
(maʾdhūn), and the Respondent (mustajīb). For example, the Prophet Muḥammad was the 
Messenger, Imam ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib was his Legatee and his spiritual successors from the 
line of Imam Ḥusayn (d. 61/680) down to the Fatimid Caliphs are the Imams. As Nāṣir has 
explained in one of his works, the Imam of every time is represented in the world by 
twenty-eight Proofs and three hundred and sixty Summoners who conduct the Ismāʿīlī 
summons and instruct the lower ranks of the Ismāʿīlī initiates (Khusraw, Expressions).
The highest ranks of the World of Religion are the recipients of taʾyīd (knowledge in the 
form of spiritual inspiration) from the Universal Intellect, which is the muʾayyid or source 
of this inspiration. In the context of ontology, taʾwīl is to perceive a particular object in its 
own ontological domain as a metaphor and symbol reflecting a corresponding reality in a 
higher ontological domain. This perception of correspondence between one world and 
another facilitates the return of the object to its spiritual origin:
(p. 173) To engage in hermeneutics (taʾwīl) is to bring the word back to its point 
of origin. The first of all existing things is Origination (ibdāʿ), which is one with 
the Intellect, and the Intellect is that which sustains (muʾayyid) all of the 
emissaries [of God].
(Jāmiʿ, ¶112, 112)
By virtue of being spiritually inspired (muʾayyad), the Messengers, the Legatees, the 
Imams, and the Proofs can perform taʾwīl and articulate it as discourse or instruction 
(taʿlīm) to lower members of the Ismāʿīlī summons. The objects of taʾwīl, each of which 
the Ismāʿīlī summoners “read” as expressions of the spiritual realities of the higher 
worlds, include the Qurʾānic text, the rules and rituals embodied in the sharīʿat, the 
World of Nature, and the psychophysical constitution of the human being. Just as the 
World of Nature and the human being are the “composition” (tarkīb) of the Universal 
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Soul, the revealed Book, the sharīʿat, and the World of Religion are the 
“compilation” (taʾlīf) of the Messenger.
A classic example of taʾwīl performed upon the Qurʾān is Nāṣir’s interpretation of the 
verse “Your women are fields for you so go into your fields in any way you wish” (Qurʾān 
2:223). While acknowledging that the outer meaning of the verse is “have intercourse 
with your wives in any way you wish,” Nāṣir discloses the inner meaning according to 
which the “women” stand for the Respondents of the Ismāʿīlī summons, and the verse 
commands the Summoner to “speak as he wishes” to them. This taʾwīl “returns” the verse 
to its corresponding reality in World of Religion: “women” in the Qurʾānic verses 
symbolize the Respondents in the World of Religion, and “intercourse” symbolizes the 
“diffusion of knowledge” (Jāmiʿ, ¶344, 262).
With respect to taʾwīl applied to the World of Nature, Nāṣir explains how among the 
various categories of minerals and animals, there are two that are most noble—such as 
red rubies and emeralds among indissoluble minerals, gold and silver among meltable 
minerals, the camel and horse among animals, the date and grape among plants, and the 
sun and moon among heavenly bodies (Jāmiʿ, ¶179, 164). He then explains that “these 
two categories are analogous for the two men amongst all mankind which are 
noblest” (Jāmiʿ, ¶180, 164), meaning the Messenger and his Legatee. This taʾwīl relates 
various natural phenomena to their corresponding origins in the World of Religion.
In other parts of the text, Nāṣir also relates how the Messenger, the Legatee, and other 
ranks of the World of Religion are symbols or manifestations of the ranks (ḥudūd) of the 
World of Origination such as the Universal Intellect and Universal Soul. These examples 
demonstrate that taʾwīl is, first and foremost, a “perception of hermeneutical 
correspondence” on the part of the exegete—presumably made possible by taʾyīd—that is 
articulated in discourse. Thus, Nāṣir’s taʾwīl integrates all of the various 
“worlds” (spiritual, natural, religious, scriptural, ritual, human) in a harmonious 
correspondence, a phenomenon that Henry Corbin aptly describes as follows: “The taʾwīl, 
without question, is a matter of harmonic perception, of hearing an identical sound (the 
same verse, the same ḥadīth, even an entire text) on several levels simultaneously” (1977, 
53–54).
As shall be seen, it is the “harmonic” nature of taʾwīl that allows Nāṣir to meet the 
daunting challenge of forging the reconciliation between philosophy and Ismāʿīlī (p. 174)
doctrine. Before turning to an exposition of the manner in which he attempts this, we 
begin with Nāṣir’s treatment of some key philosophical technical terms, as it largely sets 
the stage for the ensuing discussion.
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8.4. Philosophical Terminology
Before engaging with the philosophical questions posed in Jurjānī’s poem, Nāṣir begins 
by laying out his understanding of some key philosophical notions. His discussion 
commences with a primer on the key terms of logic as applied by Aristotle. Nāṣir begins 
by explaining that configuration (hayʾat) is different from form (ṣūrat) in that 
configuration refers to the unique shape possessed by different individuals of the same 
form (Jāmiʿ, ¶81, 82). He then goes on to explain that “definition” (ḥadd) is “that which is 
spoken about a thing such that it delimits the thing so that nothing can be added to it or 
brought out from it” (Jāmiʿ, ¶85, 85). Indeed, Nāṣir gives great importance to definitions, 
stating that “to know things in their true nature is to know the definitions of those 
things” (Jāmiʿ, ¶88, 86). Nāṣir holds that definition (ḥadd) can be used to explain two 
kinds of existents: compound things that are composed of other things like form and 
matter; and simple things that originated (mubdaʿ) ex nihilo. “Form” (ṣūrat) is “that by 
which the existence of a thing may be known,” and “matter” (hayūlā) is “a simple 
substance receptive to form” (jawharī-yi basīṭ ast padhīra-yi ṣūrat). Substance (jawhar) is 
“that which subsists in its own nature and is receptive to contrary attributes,” while 
“attribute” (ṣifat) is “an accident which descends into a substance but does not form part 
of its essence.” An existent (mawjūd) is “that which we perceive either by the five senses 
or of which the imagination forms an image, or which something else points to” (Jāmiʿ, 
¶89, 86).
Just as the proper understanding of philosophical terms is a prerequisite for engaging 
philosophical concepts, a proper engagement with the metaphysical doctrines of 
medieval Ismāʿīlīsm is contingent upon the doctrine of tawḥīd, to which we will now turn.
8.5. Theology
Although Jurjānī’s poem does not actually pose questions about tawḥīd, the very 
centrality of this doctrine in Islam seems to have motivated Nāṣir to address it at the 
beginning of his treatise. He begins by classifying all people into five groups with respect 
to their position on the nature of God: materialists, idolaters, Christians, dualists, and 
monotheists (muwaḥḥidūn). The latter group consists of the unreflective conformists (ahl-
i taqlīd), the theologians (mutakallimūn) such as the Karrāmites and Muʿtazilites, and the 
Shīʿīs. Nāṣir considers himself to be among the Shīʿī monotheists, who apply taʾwīl to the 
Qurʾān and situate true tawḥīd between the likening (tashbīḥ) of God to His (p. 175)
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creatures and complete denial of God’s attributes (taʿṭīl) (Jāmiʿ, ¶26, 43). Nāṣir 
articulates his Shīʿī Ismāʿīlī concept of tawḥīd by offering a number of criticisms against 
the other Islamic theological camps.
Nāṣir begins his critique with the unreflective conformists (ahl-i taqlīd) by dismissing 
their insistence that God is simultaneously unlike anything and also “hearing” and 
“seeing” as a contradiction. He refers to their view that God’s knowing, hearing, and 
seeing is real, while man’s knowing, hearing, and seeing are figurative or borrowed as 
absurd, and accuses the literalists of likening God to His creatures. Nāṣir is even less 
impressed by their claim that “God sees others while they do not see Him,” and points out 
that the Qurʾān (7:27) also says this about Satan and his minions (Jāmiʿ, ¶30, 45). He goes 
on to accuse the literalists of not even practicing a true literal exegesis, and instead “in 
many instances, evading literal interpretation, engaging in hermeneutics, or simply 
bickering in their own ignorance” (Jāmiʿ, ¶34, 47). This is particularly evident for 
scriptural passages that mention God’s face, hands, or eyes, before which the literalists 
are entirely at odds with one another. Nāṣir concludes his critique of the literalists by 
remarking that their belief in God as literally having ninety-nine names amounts to 
nothing but sheer polytheism:
They state that God has ninety-nine names, each of which has its distinct meaning. 
But any rational person knows that anyone who has ninety-nine names cannot be 
a single person, for each of the ninety-nine must have its own essence. Polytheism, 
not monotheism, underlies this group’s teachings.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶40, 51)
The next part of Nāṣir’s discourse targets the theology of the Karrāmites, namely 
followers of Ibn Karrām (d. 255/869). The Karrāmite position, as related by Nāṣir, asserts 
that God is a body but unlike other bodies, and is knowing, living, and powerful but that 
His knowledge, life, and power are unlike the knowledge, life, or power of others. Nāṣir 
contends that this doctrine is absurd and meaningless. For example, to say, “He is a body 
not like bodies” means, “He is a body, not a body,” which is contradictory (Jāmiʿ, ¶42, 52). 
Nāṣir dismisses the Karrāmite position concerning God’s knowledge, life, and power (i.e., 
that they are unlike that of His creatures) by recalling the manner in which the Qurʾān 
also qualifies human beings and other creatures with knowledge, power, or life (Jāmiʿ, 
¶44, 53).
Nāṣir also anticipates a Karrāmite objection to his argument: to deny that God is 
knowing, living, or powerful effectively leads one to conclude that God is ignorant, dead, 
and powerless. In response, Nāṣir argues that both pairs of attributes—knowledge and 
ignorance, life and death, power and incapacity—are inadmissible for God and must be 
negated from Him. This is because both pairs of attributes are creaturely qualities and 
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thus invalid for describing God (Jāmiʿ, ¶45, 55–56). In this respect, Nāṣir articulates an 
Ismāʿīlī form of the via negativa called double negation. This position was first 
championed by Ismāʿīlī thinkers such as al-Sijistānī and Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 322/934). 
While al-Sijistānī and al-Rāzī negated qualities such as existence and nonexistence, 
definition and nondefinition, and perfection and imperfection from God, Nāṣir also 
employs (p. 176) double negation to negate Qurʾānic names of God, such as the Knowing 
(ʿālim), the Living (ḥayy), and the Powerful (qādir), as well as their opposites. Nāṣir 
concludes his critique of the Karrāmites on the subject of the divine attributes by 
accusing them of merely projecting their own inadequate ideas of perfection and 
goodness onto God, and thus falling into polytheism (shirk):
It is wrong to describe God by such attributes as “ignorance” and 
“powerlessness”—not because they are unseemly but because they are attributes 
of creatures—as well as that it is also wrong to ascribe the opposites of such 
attributes, such as “knowledge” and “power,” to Him—glory be to Him, He is 
exalted—on the grounds that these too are creaturely qualities. The so-called 
theologians of this community have plunged into grievous error in their inquiry, in 
ascribing their own fine qualities to God and in declaring Him devoid of their bad 
qualities. And for this very reason, they have fallen into polytheism.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶46, 55)
The final portion of Nāṣir’s critique attacks the Muʿtazilite position on tawḥīd. He begins 
by summarizing their position, that “the Creator is one, eternal, powerful, living, hearing, 
and seeing; that His attributes are inherent to His essence; and that He is not 
comparable to anything” (Jāmiʿ, ¶54, 61). Nāṣir does offer some praise to the Muʿtazilites, 
remarking that “there is no approach (ṭarīqatī) stronger than theirs among the various 
schools of Islam on the subject of tawḥīd” (Jāmiʿ, ¶55, 61). But he also proudly declares 
that no one has been able to critique the Muʿtazilites apart from his own group—the 
People of Spiritual Inspiration (ahl-i taʾyīd). Nāṣir begins this critique by first attacking 
the Muʿtazilite claim that belief in tawḥīd should not be based on taqlīd (uncritical 
acceptance). He does so by accusing the Muʿtazilites of confusing genuine taqlīd with 
familiarity and habit. He contrasts them by explaining that the latter, habit, is evident in 
the belief that the world is eternal and has no creator (accordingly, a belief has no 
prophetic summons), while the former, genuine taqlīd, is that to which all the Prophets 
summoned humankind. Nāṣir evidently sees value in taqlīd as a necessary first step to 
arriving at deeper truth: “He who rejects taqlīd never arrives at the discernment of 
deeper truth; it is by way of acceptance that one arrives at God’s oneness and a grasp of 
the truth” (Jāmiʿ, ¶58, 63). But Nāṣir also asserts that a person who accepts the Prophet’s 
Book and the sharīʿat through taqlīd is equally obliged to study their taʾwīl. He argues this 
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need for the taʾwīl of the Qurʾān by quoting several Qurʾānic verses that describe God 
with the qualities of His creatures, such as speech, creation, providence, mockery, 
revenge, knowledge, power, life, and hearing. Unless interpreted through taʾwīl, these 
verses simply lead to contradictory anthropomorphism (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶ 59–60, 86).
Nāṣir then attempts to refute the Muʿtazilite doctrine that at least some of God’s 
attributes are identical with His Essence (the so-called Muʿtazilite doctrine of essential 
attributes) (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶61–62, 65–66). He notes that an attribute (ṣifa) cannot subsist by 
itself but only through what it qualifies (mawṣūf), and any such attribute would be an 
accident in God’s essence. Thus, qualifying God with any sort of attributes leads to His 
essence being a substrate of accidents (maḥall-i aʿrāḍ). This leads Nāṣir to conclude that
(p. 177) an essence with six different attributes (knowledge, power, life, hearing, seeing, 
eternity) is actually a composite substance. “This doctrine of theirs,” Nāṣir writes, “that 
attributes are attributes essentially, comes from a sort of fervour which has alighted 
within their hearts, a fervour which they cannot quite articulate correctly” (Jāmiʿ, ¶62, 
66). Nāṣir concludes his critique of the Muʿtazilites by accusing them of the very 
anthropomorphism that they sought to avoid:
To posit one essence with six different attributes is not true tawḥīd. Quite the 
opposite: it is to posit a multiplicity. Nor can it be true tawḥīd to ascribe 
creaturely attributes to God. On the contrary, that is anthropomorphism. This 
group never sees anything better than themselves and indeed, fancy themselves to 
be God.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶64, 67)
Through his critique of the literalists, the Karrāmites, and the Muʿtazilites, it is evident 
that Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s concept of tawḥīd negates all attributes and qualities from God, 
such as knowledge, life, power, hearing, and sight. He equally negates the opposites of 
these attributes from God, namely ignorance, death, incapacity, deafness, and blindness. 
As will be seen in subsequent parts of the Jāmiʿ, Nāṣir also exalts God above intelligibility 
and oneness. In another work, he elevates God above philosophical and ontological 
categories such as cause and effect, unity and multiplicity, existence and nonexistence, 
and necessary and contingent being (Khusraw, Liberation, 42). This overall perspective 
serves as the foundation for Nāṣir’s Neoplatonic metaphysics explored in the next 
section.
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8.6. Metaphysics and Cosmogony
Nāṣir’s metaphysics unfolds in a hierarchical cosmology consisting of the following levels: 
the Command (amr) of God, Universal Intellect, Universal Soul, Matter and Form, 
Universal Nature, Universal Body, the Spheres, the Elements, and the three Kingdoms—
mineral, plant, and animal (Jāmiʿ, ¶151, 138). Ultimately, the goal of creation is the 
human being.
Nāṣir differentiates between the Origination (ibdāʿ) and “creation” (khalq). The former 
refers to the act of bringing something into being ex nihilo, while the latter is the 
determination (taqdīr) of a thing from another thing. After surveying several views on 
whether the world is originated or created with respect to its form and/or matter, Nāṣir 
observes that the world is configured, articulated, mobile, constrained, and compelled—
all of which serves as sufficient proof that someone or something is constraining and 
compelling the world to be the way it is (Jāmiʿ, ¶258, 200). Nāṣir concludes that God is 
responsible for configuring the world in both its form and its matter, and that God’s 
action must be through His decree, as opposed to His essence or nature. He refers to this 
decree of God that configures and compels the world as an act of Origination (ibdāʿ) or
(p. 178) Command (amr). Nāṣir maintains that the creative process, from the Origination 
down to the composition of the World of Nature, is atemporal and instantaneous: “There 
was absolutely no temporal ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the existence of the heavens, one with 
respect to the other” (Jāmiʿ, ¶307, 227).
Nāṣir then argues that the existence of particular souls in the vegetables, plants, and 
human beings implies the existence of the Universal Soul as the origin of the world. He 
also reasons that the existence of intellect (ʿaql) in human beings among all animals 
implies that it is a higher faculty in which the nobility of the soul is found. This allows him 
to conclude that there is a Universal Intellect over and above the Universal Soul (Jāmiʿ, 
¶258, 200).
8.6.1. Universal Intellect and Universal Soul
Nāṣir-i Khusraw, along with other medieval Ismāʿīlī thinkers such as al-Sijistānī and al-
Rāzī, regards the Universal Intellect (ʿaql-i kullī) as the first originated being by means of 
God’s Command, and the Universal Soul (nafs-i kullī) as the emanation of the Universal 
Intellect. The Universal Intellect is perfect in potentiality and actuality. It is the simple, 
luminous substance that contains the forms of all things (Jāmiʿ, ¶89, 88). In another work, 
Nāṣir describes the Intellect as being endowed with the seven essential attributes: 
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eternity (dahr), truth (ḥaqq), joy (shādī), demonstration (burhān), life (zindigānī), 
perfection (kamāl), and self-sufficiency (bī-nīyāzī) (Khusraw, Khwān, 150–51). While Nāṣir 
negated these attributes from God Himself, he applies them to the Universal Intellect 
and, in a less perfect manner, to the Universal Soul. The Universal Intellect contemplates 
its own essence as the intellecter (ʿāqil), the intellect (ʿaql), and the intellected (maʿqūl), 
as there is nothing that its essence does not encompass (Jāmiʿ, ¶105, 104). Throughout 
the Jāmiʿ, Nāṣir refers to the Universal Intellect as the “Active Intellect” (ʿaql-i faʿʿāl), a 
term bequeathed by Aristotle (Aristotle, De Anima, 3.5) and appropriated in early Islamic 
philosophy before Nāṣir’s time, most notably in the Neoplatonic cosmologies of Fārābī (d. 
339/950) and Avicenna (d. 428/1037).
8.6.2. Unity and Multiplicity
The Intellect, being complete and actual, is existentially united with the Command of God 
in the manner that “white” and “whiteness” are one in existence. Nāṣir even 
differentiates between the “Absolute One” (aḥad; yakī-yi maḥḍ) that admits no 
multiplicity, and the “Multiple One” (wāḥid; yakī-yi mutakaththir) that is at the root (aṣl) 
of multiplicity. Thus, God is the “Absolute One,” and the Universal Intellect is the 
“Multiple One” because it is comprised of both “oneness” (waḥdat)—identified with the 
Command of God—and “substance” (jawhar), which implies potential multiplicity. The 
term “the one” (wāḥid; yakī) in the numerical sense properly applies to the Universal 
Intellect and not to God as such. God Himself is the Originator (al-mubdiʿ) of both “the 
one” (wāḥid) (p. 179) and “oneness” (waḥdat), where the latter is His Command or trace 
(athar) (Jāmiʿ, ¶150, 137). A similar observation is to be found in later Islamic thought in 
the writings of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) and his school, where they distinguish between 
God’s exclusive oneness (aḥadiyya) and His inclusive oneness (wāḥidiyya) (Rustom 2014). 
In Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s Jāmiʿ, this distinction would correspond to the “Absolute One” (God 
as such) and the “Multiple One” (Universal Intellect) respectively.
8.6.3. Eternity, Time, and Perfection
Nāṣir defines eternity (dahr) as “the continuance of the eternal substance” (Jāmiʿ, ¶114, 
113) and “absolute duration” (baqā-yi muṭlaq) (Jāmiʿ, ¶115, 113). Nāṣir even deconstructs 
the philosophers’ singular notion of eternity by making a clear distinction between the 
“eternalizer” (azal, the agent of eternity), “eternality” (azaliyya), and the being (azalī) 
that is “made” eternal. This tripartite distinction of eternity applies respectively to God 
(the “eternalizer”), His Command (“eternality”), and the Universal Intellect, the being 
Reconciling Religion and Philosophy: Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s (d. 1088) Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn
Page 13 of 27
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: null; date: 04 November 2016
that is rendered “eternal” through the manifestation of eternality, identified with God’s 
Command (Jāmiʿ, ¶193, 172).
In his Shish faṣl (Khusraw, Six Chapters, 44), Nāṣir explains that the Universal Intellect is 
perpetually in a state of blissful self-contemplation through its praise and worship of God. 
This praise of the Intellect causes the emanation of the Universal Soul, which is perfect in 
potentiality but imperfect in actuality due to its coming into being through the mediation 
of the Intellect. In delineating their relationship in the Jāmiʿ—in a manner akin to what is 
found again in Ibn ʿArabī and his school (Murata 1992, 162–64)—Nāṣir draws on such 
Qurʾānic terms as the Pen (qalam) and the Tablet (lawḥ). The Universal Intellect produces 
its loci of manifestation (maẓāhirāt) by emanating its intelligible forms (ṣūrat) upon the 
Universal Soul, just as a pen writes upon a paper in producing calligraphy (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶262–
63, 202–3). Such an explanation serves to integrate Qurʾānic taʾwīl with the Neoplatonic 
Islamic doctrine of emanation. The Universal Soul desires to actualize its potential 
perfection and is therefore in a state of perpetual movement or activity. The movement of 
the Universal Soul creates and generates the Cosmos—consisting of Form, Matter, 
Universal Nature, human souls, and the physical world. Thus, the Universal Soul is the 
Creator (khāliq) or Artisan (ṣāniʿ) of the Cosmos, which is generated as a limited 
reflection of the Universal Intellect (Khusraw, Six Chapters, 71). Although the Universal 
Intellect and Universal Soul are both within the horizon of eternity (dahr), it is the 
Universal Soul that causes time and motion:
Just as eternity lies within the bound of the [Universal Intellect], so does time lie 
within the bound of the Universal Soul; that is to say, the cause of eternity (dahr) 
is the Intellect just as the cause of time (zamān) is the Soul. We say that the cause 
of time is the [Universal] Soul since time consists of the number of movements of 
the sphere, according to the proponents of both forms of wisdom.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶114, 113)
(p. 180) The purpose of the Universal Soul’s creation of the Cosmos is to engender 
perfect human souls such that through these souls the Universal Soul actualizes its own 
perfection and returns to the Universal Intellect (Khusraw, Six Chapters, 49). At the 
individual level, “The [human] soul’s perfection occurs through knowledge by way of this 
tremendous construction” (Jāmiʿ, ¶117, 115). At the historical and collective level, the 
Universal Soul engenders perfect souls through the historical cycles of the six 
Messengers: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad. The great soul who 
serves as the final instrument of the Universal Soul’s actualization of perfection is the 
seventh among the Messengers, called the Master of the Resurrection (qāʾim-i qiyāmat), 
who reveals the spiritual meaning or bāṭin of all prophetic revelations. Akin to a 
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Messianic figure, this individual who is the most perfect manifestation of the Universal 
Intellect ushers in the eschatological return of the Soul to the Intellect:
The self-sufficiency of the Universal Soul from any neediness of its own occurs 
through that individual who can receive the connection with the Universal 
Intellect in its entirety and become the leader of all humanity, the final leader of 
all leaders, and so bring the cycle to its close. Every group has a name for him. 
One group calls him “Messiah,” who will return; another calls him “Mahdi,” and 
yet another, “Qāʾim.”
(Jāmiʿ, ¶117, 116)
Since the Cosmos acts as the vehicle of perfection, attention will now be given to Nāṣir’s 
cosmology.
8.7. Cosmology
The Universal Soul gives rise to two hypostases, namely Prime Matter and Universal 
Nature. Prime Matter is like a shadow of the Universal Soul. The Universal Soul is 
continuously inspired by the Universal Intellect and also contemplates Prime Matter in its 
creative act. Its contemplation of Prime Matter is noble (sharīf), and this gives rise to 
Universal Nature, which is an active substance (Jāmiʿ, ¶135, 124). Thus, Nāṣir views 
Universal Nature as a subtle (laṭīf) entity that serves as the “pupil” (shāgird) of the 
Universal Soul. Universal Nature is omnipresent in all things: “The world is filled with 
Universal Nature, though it occupies no place whatsoever within it, for it is a substance 
without spatial location (jawhar-i nā jāy-gīr)” (Jāmiʿ, ¶134, 124). With respect to its 
function, Universal Nature “preserves each and every one of the various natures in its 
form so that none of them falls asunder, expires, or decays” (Jāmiʿ, ¶132, 123).
8.7.1. The Origin of Genus and Species
In several parts of the Jāmiʿ Nāṣir offers a detailed discussion of the hierarchy among 
genus, species, and individuals in the physical world. He examines the question of
(p. 181) priority among them from two perspectives—the intelligible (logical) and the 
physical. According to the intelligible perspective, Nāṣir notes that “the precedence of 
species over the individual and of genus over species is not temporal … rather, it is 
essential” (Jāmiʿ, ¶278, 212). Yet, according to the physical and temporal perspective, 
Nāṣir states the following:
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The species is sustained by the individual, the species sustains the genus, despite 
the fact that the individual is within the species and the species is within the 
genus. In the same way, the whole depends upon its parts, even if the parts are 
contained within the whole.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶269, 206)
Within the context of the temporal and physical dependence of species upon individuals, 
Nāṣir sets forth his theory on the origin of species according to which each species 
(vegetable, animal, human) ultimately derive through physical descent from a “primordial 
instantiating couple” (Jāmiʿ, ¶318, 236). This originating couple is not born but created 
without physical birth. Because each species ultimately comes from a group of two 
individuals (the primordial couple who together make a genus), Nāṣir’s conclusion 
concerning the question of priority between genus, species, and individuals is that they 
all “occurred at a single stroke” (Jāmiʿ, ¶318, 236).
8.7.2. The Seven Lights
One of the most eloquent examples of Nāṣir’s harmonization of the teachings of the 
philosophers and Ismāʿīlī doctrine occurs fairly early in the Jāmiʿ (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶104–7, 103–7). 
In this section, Nāṣir employs taʾwīl to illustrate the correspondence between the 
aforementioned three worlds—the spiritual World of Origination, the physical World of 
Nature, and the intermediary World of Religion (which includes the human microcosm). 
Nāṣir’s central thesis, which is characteristic of Ismāʿīlī thought in general, is that each 
world contains the traces or manifestations of the contents of the world that is higher 
than it. He begins by noting the philosophers’ view that the physical heavens or the 
spheres contain seven hierarchical planets (ajrām) whose light shines upon the earth. 
Likewise, the physical earth contains seven fusible minerals in a hierarchy of nobility 
consisting of gold, silver, iron, copper, tin, lead, and mercury, each of which receives a 
share of light from the seven planets commensurate to their nature. The World of 
Origination contains seven primordial lights or “planets of intellect” that cause the 
corporeal lights or physical planets. These seven lights are God’s Command; the 
substance (jawhar) of the Universal Intellect; the Universal Intellect that contemplates its 
own essence as Intellect (ʿaql), Intellecter (ʿāqil), and Intellected (maʿqūl); the Universal 
Soul; and the Archangels Jadd, Fatḥ, and Khayāl.
These seven intellectual lights of the World of Origination are manifest respectively in the 
physical heavens as the seven planets—Sun, Moon, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and 
Mercury—which are their effects or traces (table 8.1). The seven physical lights, in turn,
(p. 182) manifest and shine upon the physical earth through the seven metals—gold, 
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silver, iron, copper, tin, lead, and mercury. The seven intellectual lights also manifest in 
the human soul, the microcosm, in accordance with its capacity to contain seven 
attributes—life, knowledge, power, perception, action, will, and continuance. The heavens 
and earth of the World of Nature are mirrored by the heavens and earth of the World of 
Religion. In the heavens of the World of Religion, there are seven renowned lights: the 
seven Messengers, namely Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muḥammad, and the 
Master of Resurrection. These parallel the seven planets of the physical heavens, and 
have received the greatest share of the seven lights. The earth of the World of Religion 
consists of the ranks (ḥudūd) of the Ismāʿīlī summons comprised of the aforementioned 
Messenger, his Legatee, the Imam, the Proof, the Summoner, the Licensed Teacher, and 
the Respondent. Just as the seven minerals of the physical earth manifest a share of light 
from the seven planets, the seven ranks of the Ismāʿīlī summons hierarchy receive a 
share of the light of the Universal Intellect with the Prophet’s soul being the most noble 
in this reception. This correspondence illustrated by Nāṣir-i Khusraw is an eloquent form 
of taʾwīl, demonstrating how the existents of the physical world “return” to the realities of 
the spiritual world. As Nāṣir insists that the human being is the reflection of the cosmos, 
the next section will explore his psychology and its attendant relationship with his 
cosmology.
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World of Nature (ʿālam-t.abī ʿat) Human 
Microcosm (ālam-
i ṣaghīr)
World of Religion (āālam-i dīn)
Heavens Earth Heavens Earth
Origination (ibdāʿ) Sun Gold Life Adam Messenger
Substance of 
Intellect
Moon Silver Knowledge Noah Legatee
Intellect-Intellecter-
Intellected
Saturn Iron Power Abraham Imam
Universal Soul Jupiter Copper Perception Moses Proof
Jadd (Fortune) Mars Tin Act Jesus Summoner
Fatḥ (Opening) Venus Lead Will Muhammad Licensed Teacher
Khayāl (Imagination) Mercury Mercury Continuance Master of 
Resurrection
Respondent
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8.8. Psychology
Nāṣir Khusraw’s psychology is rooted in his conceptions of the soul (nafs), intellect (ʿaql), 
and rational utterance (nuṭq). Nāṣir holds that the human soul is a part (juzʾ) of (p. 183)
the Universal Soul in the sense that the substance (jawhar) of the human soul is of the 
same substance as the Universal Soul. In this sense, individual human souls are 
instantiations of the Universal Soul. Like the Universal Soul, the human soul is enduring 
(bāqī) and accepting of knowledge (Hunsberger 2000, 213). The human soul contains 
three faculties that are traces (athar) of the Universal Soul: the growing soul (nafs-i 
nāmiyya), which is also present in plants; the sensory soul (nafs-i ḥissiyya), which is also 
present in speechless animals; and the speaking or rational soul (nafs-i sukhan-gūʾi; nafs-i 
nāṭiqa), which is present in human beings (Khusraw, Six Chapters, 54). The human soul is 
also gifted with an individual intellect (ʿaql), which Nāṣir defines as a simple substance by 
which human beings perceive things as they truly are (Jāmiʿ, ¶285, 218). Among these 
human psychological faculties, Nāṣir remarks that “life is the guardian of the body, that 
the rational soul is the guardian of life, and that the intellect is the guardian of the 
rational soul” (Jāmiʿ, ¶285, 218). With respect to the distinction between the body, the 
soul, and the intellect, he says that bodies are satiated by food, the soul (nafs) is that 
which feeds on knowledge but is never satiated, and the intellect (ʿaql) is that which 
governs the body and soul and also infers signs from the visible to the unseen (Jāmiʿ, 
¶102, 101).
8.8.1. Macrocosm and Microcosm
Later in the Jāmiʿ, Nāṣir illustrates a set of astrological, psychological, and religious 
correspondences involving the relationship between the World of Nature, the Human 
Microcosm, and the World of Religion (see table 8.2).  He begins by grouping the twelve 
houses of the zodiac with the seven planets. Each planet has two astrological houses (i.e., 
Mercury has Virgo and Gemini), while the sun and moon only have one house each (Leo 
and Cancer respectively) because their influence is greater than the other five planets. 
The sun and moon each serve as an authority (sulṭān) over the other five planets, which 
are like their servants, while each sulṭān has dominion (wilāyat) over five astrological 
houses (with each house belonging to one of the five planets) (Jāmiʿ, ¶329, 247).
Nāṣir understands the seven planets as “tools” of the Universal Soul under the guidance 
of the Universal Intellect in the production of the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms, 
whose ultimate purpose is the creation of the human form (ṣūrat-i shakhsī mardūm), 
which is capable of acquiring knowledge and wisdom (Jāmiʿ, ¶328, 246). This astrological 
2
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configuration of the macrocosm (ʿālam-i kabīr) is mirrored within the physical 
constitution of the human form, the microcosm (ʿālam-i ṣaghīr). Parallel with the sun of 
the macrocosm is the heart of the human being, which is receptive to the sun’s influence 
and is the abode of the spirit (ruḥ) or intellect (ʿaql). Mirroring the moon of the 
macrocosm is the brain, which is receptive to the moon’s influence and is the abode of 
the rational soul (nafs-i nāṭiqa) wherein are the internal faculties like imagination, 
memory, recollection, and discernment. Just as the moon receives the light (p. 184) of the 
sun, thoughts begin in the heart and are transmitted to the brain. The other five planets 
(Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn) of the macrocosm are paralleled by the five 
human senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch). Just as each planet has two 
astrological houses, the instruments of each of the physical senses are in two parts (i.e., 
two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, two sides of the mouth, and two hands).







Sun (Leo) Heart: Animates Body 
(spirit/intellect)
Messenger: taʾlīf of Book 
and sharīʿat
Moon (Cancer) Brain: Governs Body 
(rational soul)
Legatee: taʾwīl of Book 
and sharīʿat
Mercury (Virgo, Gemini) Eyes: Sight (right eye, left 
eye)
Imam (exoteric, esoteric)
Venus (Libra, Taurus) Ears: Hearing (right ear, 
left ear)
Gate (exoteric, esoteric)
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After showing the correspondence between the macrocosm and microcosm, Nāṣir 
demonstrates how both realms are also reflected in the World of Religion or mesocosm. 
The Messenger occupies the place of the sun in the macrocosm and the heart in the 
microcosm because the life of the World of Religion comes through his compilation 
(taʾlīf) of the revealed Book and the sharīʿat. His Legatee occupies the place of the moon 
and the brain because he brings order to the world of religion through his taʾwīl of the 
Book and the sharīʿat. The five religious dignitaries (ḥudūd) under the Legatee, namely 
the Imam, Gate (bāb), Proof, Summoner, and Licensed Teacher, are analogous to the five 
planets of the macrocosm and the five senses of the human being. Just as each planet has 
two astrological houses, these five dignitaries watch over both the exoteric (ẓāhir) and 
esoteric (bāṭin) aspects of the Book and the sharīʿat. Likewise, there are six days in the 
physical world, and the World of Religion has six prophetic cycles of the six Messengers—
the cycles of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muḥammad. As the six days are 
succeeded by the seventh day or Sabbath, the six prophetic cycles are succeeded by the 
cycle of the Master of Resurrection. Such a correspondence between the macrocosm, 
microcosm, and the World of Religion allows Nāṣir-i Khusraw to declare:
(p. 185) Just as God the Exalted composed the structure of the human body on an 
analogy with the structure and composition of the world, the Prophet established 
the true religion on an analogy with the creation of man, so that the sages of 
religion would see this great model and see that it accords with creation.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶338, 253)
8.8.2. The Soul-Body Relationship
When dealing with the question of the relationship between the soul and the body, Nāṣir 
discusses the philosophers’ view that a human being with respect to his ‘I-ness’ or 
selfhood is a combination of body and soul. He agrees with this notion while cautioning 
that the body-soul relationship cannot be understood in literally the same way that a 
knight consists of a man upon a horse (Jāmiʿ, ¶95, 97). He also accepts Aristotle’s 
definition of the soul as the perfection of the body, interpreting it to mean that the body is 
potentially living, while the soul is living by its very essence.  Thus, with respect to life, 
the living body is a shadow of the human soul (Jāmiʿ, ¶109, 110).
Nāṣir also maintains that “the ‘I’ belongs to the rational soul, which is an intellectual 
substance (jawharī-yi ʿaqlī), knowing to the limit of potentiality, active by its very 
nature” (Jāmiʿ, ¶96, 97). The rational soul is the locus of action, directing the body and its 
various organs and faculties. To make the point that the body is under the soul’s control 
3
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as its “servant,” Nāṣir evokes the Platonic image of the chariot of the soul (Plato 1997,
Phaedrus 246a), where the soul is akin to a rider and the body akin to its horse (Jāmiʿ, 
¶101, 100). In agreement with Aristotle, Nāṣir also sees discourse or rational utterance 
(nuṭq) as the defining faculty of the human soul:
Rational utterance is neither Arabic nor Persian or Hindi nor any language 
whatsoever. On the contrary, it is one of the faculties of the human soul by which 
a human being is capable of conveying some meaning which lies in his innermost 
mind to others by means of his voice, written letters, and speech.
(Jāmiʿ, ¶186, 167)
8.8.3. Angelology
Nāṣir then relates his psychology to what one could call an angelic anthropology. He 
begins by discussing three kinds of angels: spiritually originated angels, visible and 
created angels, and human angels (the Prophets and Imams). The purely spiritual angels 
are originated in nature (ibdāʿī) through the mediation of the Universal Intellect, 
Universal Soul, and the Archangels Jadd, Fatḥ, and Khayāl. They are represented by the 
spheres and stars of the physical world—called the visible and created angels. Nāṣir also 
notes (p. 186) how the idea of the spheres and stars being angels is in agreement with 
the views of the early astronomer and mathematician, Thābit b. Qurra (d. 288/901) (Jāmiʿ, 
¶138, 128).
The purpose of the visible angels—the stars and spheres—is to manifest the originated 
angels through human beings who are potential angels. Subsequently, the purpose of the 
Messenger, his Legatee, and the Imams is to bring these potential angels into actuality by 
means of the Book and the sharīʿat. The person who brings these potential angels (i.e., 
human beings) into actuality is himself an actualized angel (Jāmiʿ, ¶141, 129).
Nāṣir’s discussion also broaches the subject of the jinn or parī (Jāmiʿ, ¶142, 130–31). 
Using the example of the angels bowing before Adam and the disobedience of Satan 
mentioned several times in the Qurʾān (Q 2:34, 7:11, 15:31, etc.), he differentiates 
between two types of jinn (parī)—angelic and demonic—depending on whether the jinn is 
obedient (like those who bowed to Adam) or disobedient (like Satan, who refused to bow). 
With respect to the human soul, the rational soul is a potential angel or an angelic jinn. 
The concupiscent soul (growing soul) and the irascible soul (sensual soul) are potential 
demons or demonic jinn. Nāṣir relates this to the prophetic tradition: “Every man has two 
devils who entice him.” When the concupiscent soul and irascible soul subdue the 
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rational soul, the human becomes a demon in actuality. On the other hand, when these 
“two devils” obey the rational soul, and the rational soul obeys the Prophet or Imam, the 
human being becomes an angel in actuality. Nāṣir eloquently concludes his discussion of 
angels, jinn, and demons with the following remarks: “Within the human being there is 
both an angel and a demon, but he himself is a parī (jinn). Human beings are angels and 
demons in potentiality. That world beyond is filled with angels and with demons in 
actuality” (Jāmiʿ, ¶145, 133).
8.9. Epistemology
Several sections of the Jāmiʿ treat questions pertaining to the nature of knowledge, the 
ways of knowing, and perfection of the rational soul by means of knowledge. Knowledge, 
in the worldview of Nāṣir-i Khusraw and other Ismāʿīlī thinkers, has a salvific and 
eschatological dimension as the Universal Soul’s perfection is achieved through human 
souls becoming actualized through knowledge.
8.9.1. Knowledge and Intellect
Nāṣir defines knowledge (ʿilm; dānish) as “a conception (taṣawwur) on our parts of a 
thing as it really is” (Jāmiʿ, ¶89, 87). This view of knowledge as conception appears to be 
a discursive knowing, relating to the definition (ḥadd) of a thing as the means of knowing 
its true nature (Jāmiʿ, ¶88, 86). In this respect, knowledge is dependent upon articulate 
discourse (sukhan), as Nāṣir states: “But the perfection of the rational soul comes 
through knowledge and knowledge comes to man only through discourse” (p. 187) (Jāmiʿ, 
¶116, 114).  Nāṣir also contrasts knowledge (ʿilm) with maʿrifat or recognition (shinākht). 
In this context, knowledge is acquired by human beings through various media (thought, 
crafts, revelation, instruction) and includes things such as language and philosophy. 
Recognition, on the other hand, is innate and not acquired. It consists of the direct 
recognition or apprehension of things by their natures, such as thirst, hunger, or pain, 
without necessarily knowing their names (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶283–84, 217).
Nāṣir distinguishes between ʿilm and intellect (ʿaql) when he defines intellect as a simple 
substance by which people perceive (andar yāband) things (Jāmiʿ, ¶285, 218). 
Accordingly, Nāṣir understands ʿilm to be a trace (athar) and act (fiʿl) of the intellect, and 
notes that the intellect is, therefore, superior to ʿilm, which is its trace (Jāmiʿ, ¶280, 216). 
In a similar vein, he defines the knower (ʿālim; dānishmand) as one who conceives a thing 
as it really is. This knower is contrasted with the intellectual (ʿāqil), who perceives (andar 
4
5
Reconciling Religion and Philosophy: Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s (d. 1088) Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn
Page 23 of 27
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: null; date: 04 November 2016
yāft) things as they truly are. The intellect can also know both sensible objects 
(maḥsūsāt) and intelligible objects (maʿqūlāt) at the same time (Jāmiʿ, ¶285, 218). The 
distinction between knowledge and intellect appears to correspond to the distinction 
mentioned earlier between knowledge and recognition, especially when Nāṣir, somewhat 
allusively, remarks that recognition is the basis of intellect (Jāmiʿ, ¶284, 218). At the 
conclusion of this chapter, Nāṣir notes that the names “knowing” (ʿālim) and 
“intelligent” (ʿāqil) cannot be applied to God directly and instead refer to the originated 
Universal Intellect (Jāmiʿ, ¶285, 218).
8.9.2. Perception
In Nāṣir’s theory of perception (idrāk; andar yāftan), the universal perceiver (ḥiss-i kullī) 
is the substance (jawhar) of the human soul that perceives through the five external 
faculties (sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch), and through the five internal faculties 
(estimation, reflection, imagination, memory, and recollection). Mainly concerned with 
external sense perception, Nāṣir argues that “the perceiving agent, i.e. the mudrik who 
perceives, is affected by his own act of perception; his state is altered while the object of 
perception remains as it was” (Jāmiʿ, ¶292, 221). Nāṣir also speaks of various levels of 
perception in relation to the different kinds of temporal existents: the eye perceives what 
is in the present, the ear perceives what was of the past, reflection (fikrat) perceives what 
will be in the future; and the intellect perceives the simple originated beings (mubdaʿāt) 
(Jāmiʿ, ¶294, 222). God as the Originator (mubdiʿ) is not reached by perception qua 
perception, not even by the Universal Intellect. Unlike Neoplatonic and Peripatetic 
Islamic philosophy, where the Intellect contemplates God in an active manner, for Nāṣir, 
the (p. 188) Universal Intellect only “perceives” or “affirms” God in a passive and indirect 
sense through the contemplation of its own essence. This pure affirmation is free from all 
sensible and intelligible attributes, as a result of which the Intellect receives nobility and 
radiance (Jāmiʿ, ¶293, 221).
8.9.3. Instruction
The human intellect, according to Nāṣir’s epistemology, exists at two levels, the innate 
intellect (ʿaql-i gharīzī) and the acquired intellect (ʿaql-i muktasab). The former level of 
the intellect is potential and passive in its acceptance of knowledge. The latter level is an 
actual intellect that receives taʾyīd from the Universal Intellect. The Messengers, 
Legatees, Imams, and Proofs are the recipients of this taʾyīd. The actualization of the 
human intellect from potentiality to actuality is only accomplished through instruction 
(Jāmiʿ, ¶151, 138). Just as eyesight allows human beings to perceive sensible objects with 
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the aid of light, insight is what allows a person to perceive intelligible objects with the aid 
of knowledge. Physical sight requires light from the sun and the moon, and insight 
requires knowledge from the Messenger and his Legatee, who are the sun and moon of 
the World of Religion (Jāmiʿ, ¶¶214–15, 180).
Nāṣir distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge that the human soul requires: the 
exoteric and the esoteric. The exoteric refers to the literal revelation (tanzīl) of the Book 
and the sharīʿat, filled with parables and symbols that, in keeping with Nāṣir’s analogy of 
knowledge being food for the human soul, he compares to “fruit that is unripe and 
tasteless” (Jāmiʿ, ¶217, 181). The esoteric refers to the taʾwīl of the Book and the sharīʿat, 
which is analogous to “colour, scent, and taste” (Jāmiʿ, ¶217, 181). In a similar vein, the 
Messenger who delivers the tanzīl is the spiritual father of human beings, and his Legatee 
who discloses its taʾwīl is their spiritual mother. Just as a newborn baby can only consume 
the mother’s milk and is unable to digest dense food, the newborn initiate cannot directly 
internalize the Prophet’s tanzīl unless the Legatee first applies taʾwīl, extracting pleasing 
precepts that are amenable to the initiates (Jāmiʿ, ¶231, 187).
8.10. Reconciliation and Restoration
The foregoing presentation of the main arguments and themes in the Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn
sheds considerable light on the various ways in which Nāṣir-i Khusraw saw the 
relationship between Ismāʿīlī wisdom and the wisdom of the deiform philosophers 
(falāsifa-yi mutaʾallihān). Nāṣir expresses clear disagreement with philosophy on a small 
number of issues, the most notable example being the subject of God’s creative act, 
where he rejects views attributed to Aristotle, Socrates, and others and instead puts forth 
a distinctively Ismāʿīlī doctrine of Origination (ibdāʿ) ex nihilo coupled with the 
Neoplatonic concepts of the Universal Intellect and Universal Soul.
(p. 189) On a few other issues, most particularly the concept of the human soul, Nāṣir 
integrates his Ismāʿīlī views concerning the soul as the “I” and the body as its shadow 
with both Aristotle’s teleological conception of the soul-body relationship (i.e., that the 
soul is a perfection of the body) on the one hand, and Plato’s famous example of the 
chariot of the soul (i.e., that the soul is a “rider” of the body) on the other. Needless to 
say, Nāṣir stands in full agreement with philosophy on most issues. In such instances, he 
tends to supplement his discussion of a given topic by performing taʾwīl in order to show 
how a particular set of philosophical ideas serve as “icons” or representations for 
corresponding realities in the World of Religion and the World of Origination.
Reconciling Religion and Philosophy: Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s (d. 1088) Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn
Page 25 of 27
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: null; date: 04 November 2016
This raises the broader question of how Nāṣir and his fellow Ismāʿīlis regarded the 
tradition of philosophy. In line with the general Ismāʿīlī emphasis on the distinction 
between the esoteric and the exoteric dimensions of reality, Nāṣir seems to have 
regarded philosophy as part of the more exoteric framework in need of taʾwīl in order to 
be fully understood. In this respect, Nāṣir does not regard philosophy as inherently 
contrary to Ismāʿīlī doctrine, but, rather, a “whiff” of it, just as the exoteric or physical 
realm manifests the traces of the esoteric or spiritual realm. Indeed, Nāṣir holds that all 
sciences and knowledge, including philosophy, derive from the Prophets (Jāmiʿ, ¶17, 29). 
Thus, while it can be said that the Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn presents us with Nāsir-i Khusraw’s 
attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion (i.e., Ismāʿīlī doctrine), it is equally an 
attempt to restore philosophy to its original state of union with revealed, prophetic 
wisdom. This type of restorative effort on Nāsir’s part would thus be in keeping with the 
famous saying in early Islamic thought, “Philosophy springs forth from the niche of 
prophecy” (yanbaʿu al-ḥikma min mishkāt al-nubuwwa) (Nasr 2006, 3).
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Notes:
( ) This chapter uses Eric Ormsby’s translation of the Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn (2012). 
References to the Jāmiʿ are as follows: the title, the paragraph number in the original 
Persian text (which is retained in Ormsby’s translation), and the page number(s) of the 
translation itself.
( ) For a similar table, see Hunsberger 2002.
( ) In another work (Khusraw 1998), and in keeping with the Aristotelian notion of 
hylomorphism, Nāṣir defines the human soul as the form (ṣūrat) of the body.
( ) In this passage, I have rendered sukhan as “discourse,” as opposed to “language,” as 
translated by Ormsby.
( ) Elsewhere (Khusraw, Khwān, 194), Nāṣir equates maʿrifat or recognition with man’s 
knowledge of his own soul. A thorough exposition of self-knowledge as the goal of the 
philosophical life can be found in the writings of Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī (nearly half of his 
corpus is translated in Chittick 2001).
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